A Pattern of Political Manipulation in Thailand
The recent suspension of Paetongtarn Shinawatra from the premiership by the Constitutional Court is a familiar scenario, echoing past events that reveal a consistent pattern of political manipulation and orchestrated outcomes. Over two decades, there have been numerous dissolutions of leading political parties and repeated bans on elected representatives, indicating that Thailand’s democratic structure is far from genuine. Instead, it appears to be a façade masking an autocratic regime that prioritizes power consolidation over the country’s future and the will of its people.
While Ms. Paetongtarn was not entirely without fault, her leaked audio conversation with Cambodia’s former Prime Minister and Senate President Hun Sen was damaging. The content of the conversation compromised her position and Thailand’s national interest, as she attempted to address border tensions with a strongman from another nation. However, the involvement of a group of senators from a questionable chamber in petitioning the nine-member Constitution Court raises serious concerns about the legitimacy of the process itself.
The 200-member senate has long faced allegations of collusion and vote-rigging. In particular, the Bhumjaithai Party has been accused of manipulating the senatorial election in June of last year, where the upper chamber was selected through internal nomination processes at various levels. Despite the Constitutional Court dismissing a petition against the Bhumjaithai Party and poll staff in the controversial senate election, lingering questions about the integrity of the upper chamber remain.
If such judicial interventions were occasional, they might be considered part of a functioning legal system. However, the repeated suspension and removal of prime ministers after every election for 20 years signals a deeper issue within Thailand’s democracy. Ms. Paetongtarn is the sixth prime minister to face such a fate, although her final status remains pending. Previous suspended leaders include Samak Sundaravej, Somchai Wongsawat, Yingluck Shinawatra, Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, and Srettha Thavisin. Notably, all except Gen Prayut were members of the Shinawatra clan, led by Thaksin Shinawatra.
This situation extends beyond the Shinawatra family and Mr. Thaksin, who is currently facing charges related to royal defamation and violations of his jail conditions after returning from 15 years of self-exile. The political drama surrounding minor media shareholdings also led to the dissolution of the Future Forward Party and its leader, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, in November 2019. The Move Forward Party, its successor, and its leader Pita Limjaroenrat faced similar challenges after winning the May 2023 election.
Mr. Thaksin’s enemies have targeted him and his clan due to his role in opening up the Thai political system and awakening rural masses, despite his involvement in conflicts of interest and corruption. However, the forces capable of seizing power, banning elected officials, and dissolving political parties are driven by immediate threats rather than just the Shinawatras.
Putting Ms. Paetongtarn in limbo, even while she continues as culture minister after a cabinet reshuffle, may lead to political intractability and policy paralysis. This could frustrate the public into demanding extra-parliamentary intervention to resolve the manufactured deadlock. Similar scenarios have occurred in 2005-06, 2008, and 2023-14, when street demonstrations paved the way for military coups or judicial interventions.
Over the past two decades, Thailand has regressed economically and internationally due to its political standstill and autocratic tendencies. The current political environment remains precarious and volatile. The so-called “super deal” that brought Mr. Thaksin back from exile appears aimed at keeping Move Forward out, not advancing Thailand under a Shinawatra-led government. If the court returns a favorable verdict for Ms. Paetongtarn, she will still face significant challenges, including street protests, parliamentary grilling, economic stagnation, and declining public sentiment.
Given the presence of a national assembly, it is important to anticipate its composition. If the current assembly remains without Ms. Paetongtarn, a new prime minister could be chosen from pre-election party lists. Anutin Charnvirakul of Bhumjaithai may have a strong chance, despite his party holding only half the strength of Pheu Thai’s 140 MPs. Chaikasem Nitisiri would be Pheu Thai’s last eligible candidate. Alternatively, a newly elected assembly would require new elections, which Ms. Paetongtarn cannot initiate while under suspension.
An appointed assembly typically follows a military takeover. As Thai politics becomes more complex and governance more chaotic, the prolonged political vacuum and ineffective government may fuel conservative calls for a military intervention to end the instability. The risk of such an intervention has increased visibly due to Ms. Paetongtarn’s suspension, coalition disputes, government uncertainty, and policy weaknesses.
In conclusion, Thailand finds itself in a messy situation under a fragile democratic system and entrenched autocracy, not due to randomness but due to deliberate actions.
